Article

Assumptions of Linguistics

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Abstract

Linguistics has treated language as a system, which is based on telementation as Roy Harris calls it. So thought is transferred from one person to another using a fixed code. However, communication accompanies extra-linguistic factors, which are eliminated from a fixed code. So it is not language that makes communication successful. Language is only a part of communication and serves as a medium among people in communities. In other words, words do not have meanings, which are usually thought to be conveyed from one person to another. Therefore, words serve as a medium to convey thoughts from one person to another. Can modern linguistics be ready for seriously considering arguments above? Or can it reject them as wrong ideas?

Key Words: telementation, a fixed code, *langue*, extra-linguistic factors, medium, meaning, integrational linguistics, contexts

Introduction

Linguistics has a long history dating back to ancient times. But its assumptions have rarely been doubted by linguists across the world. Among these linguists are Roy Harris and Moore and Carling. They call in question the validity of orthodox linguistics from the viewpoint of communication. In short, it may be communication that makes language work in our community. It may not be language that makes communication successful in our society. In this paper, we examine the protests against orthodox linguistics.

1. Telementation and a Fixed Code

According to Roy Harris, Saussure describes the typical act of communication between two individuals A and B as follows:

The starting point of the circuit [*circuit de la parole*] is in the brain of one (person), call him *A*,

where facts of consciousness, which we shall call concepts, are associated with representations of linguistic signs or acoustic images, by means of which they may be expressed. Let us suppose that a given concept triggers in the brain a corresponding acoustic image: this is an entirely *psychological* phenomenon, followed in due course by a *psychological* process: the brain transmits to the organs of phonation an impulse corresponding to that image; then sound waves are propagated from *A*'s mouth to *B*'s ear—a purely *physical* process. Next, the circuit continues in *B* in inverse order: from ear to brain the physiological transmission of the acoustic image; in the brain, the psychological association of this image with the corresponding concept. If *B* speaks in turn, this new act will follow—from his brain to *A*'s—exactly the same progression as the first, and will pass through the same consecutive phases ... (Saussure, 1922: 28; author's [Harris's] translation). (Harris 1990a: 142)

Harris refers to Saussure's model of communica-

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tion above as the 'speech circuit', which explains how thoughts are transferred from one person to another. The model of communication is also called the 'transport studies' model (Harris 1990a: 142).

Harris says that 'Saussure adopted telementation as his theory of communication' (Harris 1990d: 26). Telementation is 'the theory which explains communication as the transference of thoughts from one person's mind to another person's mind' (Harris 1990d: 26). As we have seen above, telementation is illustrated in Saussure's 'speech circuit.' It should be noted that Harris points out, 'This simple scenario assumes that A and B are speaking the same language' (Harris 1990d: 26).

So, once Saussure's idea is accepted, Harris claims, then extra-linguistic factors are eliminated from communication:

[...] the material circumstances in which linguistic activity takes place are of no significance. How such circumstances vary cannot affect, except in superficial and incidental ways, the nature of what is taking place, since it is always the internalized system [*langue*] of sound-meaning correlations which determines what *can* take place. The theory of language itself implicitly dismisses communication as a mere by-product of something more permanent and more basic, the system of linguistic knowledge [*langue*].

(Harris 1990a: 143)

Moreover, Saussure's telementation theory of communication, Harris says (Harris 1990a: 143; 1990d: 27–28), has been passed on to the present day as in Denes and Pinson (1963: 4–7), Katz (1966: 98, 103–4), Chafe (1970: 15), and Cairns and Cairns (1976: 17–18).

According to Harris, the ancestry of Saussure's 'speech circuit' model of communication is the 'translation theory' of understanding by John Locke (Harris 1990b: 153–154).

But Harris says that the English sentence, "*Pass the salt, please*" can be interpreted, depending on various cultures (Harris 1990c: 205).

Then, what enables a telementation theory to achieve successful communication? Harris insists that

[...] once any theorist adopts a telementation the-

ory of communication, [...] the inevitable result is that it leaves only one option open for explaining what a language is. The only option open is to construe a language as a fixed code, the fixed code known to both A and B.   (Harris 1990d: 28–29)

Harris also says the same thing as the above from a different perspective:

[...] construing a language as a fixed code is demanded by the internal logic of Saussure's speech circuit [telementation model of communication]. Unless the code is fixed, then invoking linguistic knowledge simply does not explain how speech communication works. Given any utterance by A, it is essential that B must not only recognize this utterance as an example of the words A intended to pronounce, but must also attach to those words the same meaning as A does. Otherwise speech communication between A and B necessarily breaks down. (Harris 1990d: 29)

So Harris claims that a telementation theory presupposes a fixed code:

[...] if speech communication is a telementation process, it demands a fixed code which A and B share. If A and B do not share this fixed code, [...] then speech communication between them must at some point break down, [...] So the theoretical assumption must be that, somehow or other, those who manage to communicate with each other via speech share and operate a fixed code, [...] The fixed code is their common language.   (Harris 1990d: 30)

If Harris is right, then, what does the fixed-code theory bring about?

[...] the fixed-code theory leads straight to what may be called the 'paradox of inquiry'. [...] A asks 'How many sides has a quadrilateral?' and B replies 'Four'. If A and B share the same fixed code, then A must already know the answer to the question; whereas in the alternative case A's question is one which it is impossible for B to understand correctly. [...] The point is that a fixed-code theory of speech communication must attribute exactly the same linguistic knowl-

edge to A and B if communication is to be successful. On this theory, therefore, it is impossible for anyone to come to know the meaning of a word by asking another person. But this conclusion is paradoxical, since asking the meaning of a word is commonly held to be a normal and unproblematic function of speech communication; and furthermore this function is generally regarded as essential for the usual processes of language-learning. (Harris 1990d: 32–33)

Not only that, but also the fixed-code theory poses a question of how *la langue* comes into existence:

[...] if speech communication is indeed based on a fixed code shared by speakers and hearers it becomes extremely difficult to explain in any plausible way how the fixed code comes to be established in the first place. [...] The larger the community the less chance there is that any two individuals will have had the same opportunity to acquire exactly the same set of correlations between forms and meanings for purposes of communication. [...] In other words, the fixed code with which A operates is presumably the unique product of A's individual linguistic experience, while the fixed code with which B operates is likewise the unique product of B's individual linguistic experience. But this conclusion contradicts the telementational account of speech communication itself; for we are left without the essential guarantee that A and B share one and the same fixed code. (Harris 1990d: 33)

So that may be the reason why Chomsky insists that we are born with ideas, which is related to his insistence that language structure (Universal Grammar) is innate.

Moreover, the speech circuit depending on a fixed code produces conflict between the demands of a fixed code and the possibility of linguistic change:

[...] if the speech circuit depends on the operation of a fixed code then innovation becomes a theoretical impossibility. If A attempts to introduce a new word, B will certainly fail to understand it since *ex hypothesi* the word is not part of the code they share. On the other hand, if either A or B can introduce innovations which are communicationally successful, then the code is not

fixed. [...] The failure to deal with it has a particular irony, since the development of linguistics has been heavily dependent on the introduction of new terminology, and Saussure's *Cours* [*de Linguistique Générale*] itself is a case in point. The work should have been incomprehensible if the theory of communication it advances is correct. (Harris 1990d: 34)

So that may be the reason why Chomsky does not think that language changes as time goes by.

Furthermore, it seems either that linguistics cannot deal with real languages like English, French, and German or that if it does it cannot be dealing with fixed codes (Harris 1990d: 35).

According to Harris, it is wrong that most linguists assume that idealizations in linguistics are necessary when they study languages (Harris 1990d: 37).

Then, what is the alternative to Saussure's theory of language?

2. Integrational Linguistics

Harris proposes an integrationalist programme, criticizing the orthodox linguistics, which he calls a segregationalist linguistics. Integrationalist linguistics attempts to integrate both extra-linguistic and linguistic factors into linguistic communication:

An integrationalist redefinition is in a position to do this [to reject the whole mythology of language structure which derives from a telementational model of communication] because it adopts a perspective which, in Saussurean terms, is neither synchronic nor diachronic but panchronic. It considers as pertinent to linguistic communication both the integration of simultaneously occurring events and also the integration of present events with past events and anticipated future events. This integration is governed by a single 'principle of contemporality', which postulates a chronological parity between linguistic and non-linguistic events in human experience. (Harris 1990d: 47)

So integrationalist linguistics explains communication as follows:

This principle [of integrationalist linguistics], which orthodox linguistics fails to recognize, is of

basic importance if we wish to have a theory of language which can explain how and why communication invariably proceeds on the assumption that every linguistic act is integrated into the individual's experience as a unique event, which has never before occurred and will never recur.　　(Harris 1990d: 48)

Hence Harris denies that words have meanings based on his insistence above:

[...] this [that each sign has a meaning] is an assumption which the integrationalist neither needs nor endorses. By denying that words, or other signs, have meanings what the integrationalist is rejecting is the orthodox claim that there is some invariant semantic value which attaches to a linguistic sign in all circumstances, and from which its interpretation is derived by those who use it. This is the myth of meaning institutionalized in dictionaries, and it is logically required by the telementational account of how speech communication works. For purposes of an integrational analysis, however, the concept of meaning may be dispensed with and replaced by that of communicational function. The crucial difference is that the communicational function of a sign is always contextually determined and derives from the network of integrational relations which obtain in a particular situation.

(Harris 1990d: 48–49)

In order to show that words do not have any invariant semantic value, Harris compares orthodox linguistics with economics attacked by the Keynesians, pointing out similarities between them (Harris 1990d: 51).

Then, what are the similarities between linguistics and economics?

They [similarities between linguistics and economics] are similarities which hinge on a common concept of 'value'. Just as orthodox linguistics treats sounds as having meanings by standing for concepts or for objects and persons in the external world, so the basic idea of economic theory which the Keynesians called in question was the idea that a pound note had a value by standing for a quantity of gold.

(Harris 1990d: 51)

What, then, do both the Keynesians and integrationalists insist on?

The Keynesian strategy is to point out that the assumption that currency notes are pieces of paper standing for quantities of precious metals fails to make sense of economic reality, where in practice money functions as a complex of mechanisms which facilitate the distribution of goods and services. Money does not in addition need to 'stand for' anything. Analogously in the linguistic case, once we see that language can be treated as a complex of mechanisms for facilitating communication there is no need to insist that linguistic signs 'stand for' anything else in addition.　　(Harris 1990d: 52)

For Harris, words do not have meanings just as money does not have value for the Keynesians.

Therefore Harris insists that integrationalism does not pursue what Saussure or Chomsky attempts to achieve (Harris 1990d: 50).

Next we shall examine how Moore and Carling deal with meanings.

3. The Container View of Meaning

Moore and Carling take up and criticize the container view of meaning:

The container view of meaning, a view that underlies both formal and informal theories of word meaning, presupposes that meaning can be studied independently of language users. On the container view, people do not mean something by words, rather words themselves have meanings. From this starting point, a three-term relation appears to have been assumed. It is supposed that there are:

(i) words.
(ii) the various classes of objects, events, situations, etc. in the world which the words refer to or pick out.
(iii) the meanings of words.

(Moore and Caring 1982: 150)

Thus, the container view treats meanings as a relation between a word and a thing in the world, eliminating language users:

On this view, characerising word meaning may be thought of as characerising a relation believed to exist between language and the 'world'. It is further implied that the world to which language may be related can be assumed to be independent of language users' perception of it. The difficulty with such a view is that it ignores the crucial *active* role of language users in relating the words they possess or produce each to their own experience of the world.

(Moore and Carling 1982: 151)

So according to Moore and Carling, in the container view, languages are thought to be independent of language users:

The container view that words 'have' meanings, however, assumes—misleadingly—that speakers and hearers are no more than passive users of a system which may be revealingly characerised independently of them. It sees language as an object or entity rather than a means whereby one language user is able to cause complex processing mechanisms to come into play within another language user.

(Moore and Carling 1982: 151)

If the container view of meaning is correct, 'the meanings of words may be specified—as in a dictionary—objectively and definitively' (Moore and Carling 1982: 151). But is it true?

Clearly some words and expressions cannot easily be thought of as containing their meaning without reference to speakers and hearers and, in a broad sense of context, the context of utterance. Typical cases of these have been held to be words such as *here*, *now*, *today*, and personal pronouns such as *I*, *you*, *she*, *we* and *they*. Such terms have been labelled indexical or deictic terms.　(Moore and Carling 1982: 151)

Moore and Carling sums up a container view of language before proposing their alternative approach to the study of language:

A container view of language gives rise to preoccupations about the relation between language and what is loosely known as the world, or sometimes, as 'reality'. [...] At the heart of the container view we have singled out its absolute presupposition that meaning is an inherent property of words and sentences. Accompanying this view has been an idealisation wide-spread in theoretical work on meaning in linguistics and philosophy away from the speaker and the hearer, the writer and the reader, and in general, the users of the language with their supportive frameworks of expectations, beliefs and categorised experience. Insofar as complex matters of this sort can be at all adequately summed up, we might say that, despite the different guises they come in, container theorists have assumed that language is best studied as a self-contained, largely autonomous system used by members of a language community to convey meaning.

(Moore and Carling 1982: 160–161)

Here, needless to say, their criticism is directed to Saussure and Chomsky.

4. An Approach Called Epiphenomenalist

Moore and Carling propose an alternative approach, which is called epiphenomenalist, to the study of language:

In our alternative approach to the study of language, an approach we call epiphenomenalist, we look at language as necessarily dependent upon language users and their individual 'states'.

We begin, then, with language users rather than language itself. We observe that they are familiar with their environment, that they have experienced or otherwise learnt about a range of phenomena and that this knowledge and experience have somehow been assimilated. Within this perspective, language may be thought of as a medium whereby one language user can cause another to access his own 'store' of accumulated and generalised knowledge and experience, to locate what appears to make sense of the sounds he hears. Looked at this way, nothing is *conveyed* from one language user to another. Language enables people to communicate—with different degrees of success—by enabling speakers to initiative within understanders a complex series of processing mechanisms which are intimately bound up with their states at the time of processing.　(Moore and Carling 1982: 161)

Here, Moore and Carling say the same thing as Harris does. They say, 'nothing is *conveyed* from one language user to another', which is echoed in Harris's insistence that Saussure's speech circuit (*circuit de la parole*) is a telementation theory of speech communication and thought is transferred from one person to another.

Furthermore, Moore and Carling think of language as a catalyst and contrast their view with the container view:

The perspective that sees language as a catalyst or trigger serving to initiate a complex series of processing mechanisms has an important consequence. Unlike the container view, there is no longer a relation to be established between language and the world, or between the structure of language and the structure of the world.   (Moore and Carling 1982: 162)

Finally Moore and Carling reach three conclusions. The first conclusion is as follows:

First, language does not, indeed cannot, convey meaning. From the epiphenomenalist perspective, language acts as a locating medium enabling one individual to cause another to gain access to knowledge, or to draw inferences from knowledge that he already has. On this view of language, meaning does not inhere in utterances but emerges from them. For the epiphenomenalist, meaning is not an inherent but an emergent property of language.
(Moore and Carling 1982: 162–163)

Their second conclusion is as follows:

The second point, and it is a corollary of the view that meaning is an emergent property, is that users and their supportive frameworks of expectations, beliefs and knowledge cannot be excluded from the study of language and, in particular, from the study of meaning. Meaning, what is understood as a result of an utterance being processed, only emerges from the complex interaction of the sounds constituting the utterance, the environment and the current state of the understander's constantly shifting 'data store'.
(Moore and Carling 1982: 163)

Finally they explain the third conclusion as follows:

The third point that follows from adopting an epiphenomenalist perspective on language is that the question of the relation between language and the world, or reality, or between the structure of language and the structure of the world, simply does not arise. [...] One of the reasons that the view of meaning as somehow an entity in itself is so pervasive and difficult to shake off may arise from the fact that language may be used metalinguistically. We are accustomed to use language to talk about language, to talk about the meaning of words, the structure of sentences, the articulation of sounds. This convenient, everyday custom may well reinforce the view that language is an object or entity which may be isolated and studied in itself. It requires a great deal of determination [...] to recognise the way in which utterances—combinations of linguistic units—far from conveying messages or information from A to B, do no more than enable A to cause B to attempt to locate within his own 'store' of accumulated and generalised experience that which appears to him to make most sense of A's words.
(Moore and Carling 1982: 164)

Furthermore, Moore and Carling point out effects that written language has on the study of language:

[...] it has seemed quite natural to isolate language, that is written language, from the overall process of communication in which other factors, gestures, postures, vocal noises other than spoken sound, play a part. This is all the more understandable since, as these other factors are not present in written language, ignoring them seems justified.
(Moore and Carling 1982: 166)

How, then, is successful communication achieved? Moore and Carling explains how speech communication is achieved successfully:

[...] language should be seen as a necessarily imperfect instrument by means of which interlocutors, each with their own supportive frameworks of knowledge, beliefs and expectations, are able to set in

motion within one another complex processing mechanisms. As a result of the workings of these mechanisms, interlocutors feel, to a greater or lesser degree, that they have understood one another. Understanding is possible whenever one speaker is able to use the sounds uttered by another to locate some appropriate area within his own 'store' of accumulated and generalised experience.　　(Moore and Carling 1982: 168)

According to Moore and Carling, important is the relation between language and language users' perception of the world (Moore and Carling 1982: 168–169).

For Moore and Carling, language use functions in extra-linguistic domains:

We assume that the processing involved in language use takes place within a complex framework of the knowledge, experience, expectations, attitudes and beliefs that language users have and, to a limited extent, share.　　(Moore and Carling 1982: 10)

If meaning cannot be transferred from one person to another just like a ball when playing catch, then how do we understand what other people say?

[...] an understander [an individual hearing and processing language] does not receive information from an utterance, but rather uses the utterance to gain access to information which in some form and to some degree he already possesses.

(Moore and Carling 1982: 12)

As we have seen, Moore and Carling's theory of language is quite different from that of orthodox linguistics. On the other hand, their view of language is very similar to Harris's theory of language, which Harris himself calls integrational linguistics.

5. Contexts in Meanings

Then, why are contexts eliminated in understanding meanings? According to F. R. Palmer, some linguists exclude context from the study of language for some reason:

[...] there are linguists who, explicitly or implicitly, exclude context from the study of semantics. The

real reason, no doubt, for this exclusion is that there are extremely great theoretical and practical difficulties in handling context satisfactorily.

(Palmer 1981: 47–48)

Moreover, there are other reasons than the above why linguists exclude context:

First, it is argued that the meaning of a sentence, or the fact that it is ambiguous or anomalous, can be known in isolation from any context, and that as speakers of a language we must know the meaning of a sentence before we can use it in any given context; meaning is thus shown to be independent of context and linguists can, and must study it without reference to context.　　(Palmer 1981: 48)

But Palmer says that the argument above is not convincing at all:

[...] there is no proof that knowing the meaning of a sentence does not entail knowing the context in which it is used.　　(Palmer 1981: 48)

Furthermore, there is another reason why context is excluded from the study of language:

A second and, at first sight, rather more plausible argument is that the world of experience must of necessity include the sum of human knowledge. If this is so, and if semantics is defined in terms of context, the scope of semantics will be infinite.

(Palmer 1981: 48)

However, there is no evading the problem above (Palmer 1981: 49).

After all, when we think about meanings, we cannot exclude from understanding them, extra-linguistic factors such as knowledge of the world:

If, moreover, we think that we are concerned with the speaker's knowledge [...] it is, surely, almost certain that the speaker does not separate, in his use of language, his knowledge of semantic structure and his knowledge of the world.　　(Palmer 1981: 51)

So Palmer cannot help thinking that extra-linguistic factors are involved in understanding meanings just like Harris and Moore and Carling.

6. Contextualization in Meanings

John Lyons also mentions 'context' when discussing meanings:

Asked by a child or a foreigner what a particular word means, we are frequently unable to answer his question without first getting him to supply some information about the context in which he has encountered the word in question. We will also say, pre-theoretically, that a certain lexeme, expression or utterance is appropriate or inappropriate, or that it is more or less effective than another, in a certain context.

(Lyons 1977: 572)

According to Lyons, however, there are two linguistics camps, whose views of meaning are different with regards to context:

Among linguists, two fairly extreme positions have been defended on this question [of context]. At one extreme, Katz and Fodor (1963), though they did not deny that contextual factors were relevant to the interpretation of actual utterances, argued that descriptive semantics should be concerned with the meaning of sentences considered independently of their utterance in actual situations. At the other extreme, we find scholars like J. R. Firth, who built up his whole theory of semantics upon the notion of context, describing what he referred to as his "technique" for the analysis of meaning in language as "a serial contextualization of our facts, context within context, each one being a function, an organ of the bigger context and all contexts finding a place in what might be called the context of culture" (1935: 33).   (Lyons 1977: 573)

Furthermore, Lyons goes on to explain that Firth takes into account not only words and phrases but also extra-linguistic factors:

Every utterance occurs in a culturally determined context-of-situation; [...] In so far as any feature of an utterance-signal can be said to contribute an identifi-able part of the total meaning of the utterance, it can be said to be meaningful. It follows that, not only words and phrases, but also speech-sounds and the paralinguistic and prosodic features of utterances, are meaningful. [...] And the meaning of each component—paralinguistic, phonological, grammatical, lexical, etc.—is described in terms of its function as an element in the structure of units of the level above. The structures of the higher-level units are the contexts in which the lower-level units function and have meaning. Semantics, in the Firthian use of the term, relates utterances to their context-of-situation; but all branches of linguistics necessarily deal with meaning.

(Lyons 1977: 607−608)

Furthermore, Firth thinks that meaning is a mixture of linguistic and extra-linguistic factors:

"Meaning ... is to be regarded as a complex of contextual relations, and phonetics, grammar, lexicology, and semantics each handles its own components of the complex in its appropriate context" (Firth, 1957: 19). The analysis of the meaning of an utterance consists in abstracting it from its actual context-of-utterance and splitting up its meaning, or function, into a series of component functions. This process of analysis is, on occasion, explained by way of analogy: "the suggested procedure for dealing with meaning is its dispersion into modes, rather like the dispersion of light of mixed wave-lengths into a spectrum" (Firth, 1957: 192). [...] Firth thinks of the meaning of an utterance as something within which the components are blended in such a way that they are not recognizable as distinct until they have been dispersed into modes by linguistic analysis.   (Lyons 1977: 609)

Firth regards meanings as being involved in context, or more broadly as being involved in culture as Harris insists, using "*Pass the salt, please*" (Harris 1990c: 205):

The key term in the Firthian theory of meaning is, of course, 'context'. [...] The context-of-culture, which Firth appeals to here, is postulated as the matrix within which distinguishable and socially significant situations occur. By invoking the concept of

the context-of-culture (which, like that of the context-of-situation, derives from his collaboration with Marinowski), Firth commits himself, as many linguists of his generation did, to the view that there is an intimate connexion between language and culture. [...] Their main purpose has been to emphasize that language-utterances, like other bits of socially significant behavior, could not be interpreted otherwise than by contextualizing them in relation to a particular culture [as Harris insists]. (Lyons 1977: 609)

In this way, for Firth, contextualization can be considered from two points of view when dealing with meanings:

Contextualization can be looked at from two points of view. We can think of it as the process whereby the native speaker of a language produces contextually appropriate and internally coherent utterances—a process which, as we have seen, involves a lot more than knowledge of the language-system [Saussure's *langue*]. We can also think of it as a process which the linguist carries out in his description of particular languages. In so far as the semantic analysis of a particular language is descriptively adequate, in Chomsky's (1965: 27) sense, there must be some correspondence between these two kinds of contextualization: the factors identified by the linguist as contextual must be the factors that determine the native speaker's production and interpretation of utterances in actual situations of use. The term 'contextualization' is used by Firth with respect to what the linguist does in describing a language; [...] We shall continue to use the term 'contextualization' both of what the native speaker does in the use of language and of what the linguist does in describing the underlying system of elements, rules and principles by virtue of which the native speaker is able to create (and interpret) what Halliday (1970b) and others refer to as text.
(Lyons 1977: 610–611)

According to Lyons, Firth regards meanings as being involved in context, extra-linguistic factors as Harris and Moore and Carling do. On the other hand, Lyons is thought to be a weak segregationalist by Harris (1996: 151). Also, Harris says about J. R. Firth:

[...] Firth's initial and seemingly radical claim that 'the central concept of the whole of semantics [...] is the context of situation [Firth 1957: 27]'. [...]

Firth distinguishes explicitly between various layers or circles of contextualization. For him 'context of situation' is no more than the immediate circumstances. Beyond that there lies a contextualization *of that context*, which falls in the domain of what he calls 'sociological linguistics'. [...]

[...] He [Firth] says: 'In that context are the human participant or participants, what they say, and what is going on [Firth 1957: 27].' [...]

[...] As Firth rightly says, they [the participants] carry their culture with them wherever they go. And not only their culture but their previous experience of this and other communication situations, together with their anticipations (whether mistaken or not) about how such a situation is likely to progress. For the integrationist [like Harris], *communication creates contexts*. (Harris 1996: 162–163)

Conclusion

Modern linguistics assumes that linguistic communication is successful without extra-linguistic factors. But Roy Harris and Moore and Carling challenges this assumption of modern linguistics.

Harris criticizes telementation and a fixed code, on which modern linguistics, he claims, is based. In other words, telementation and a fixed code eliminate extra-linguistic factors from linguistic communication.

On the other hand, Moore and Carling call in question the container view of meaning that words have meanings. They say that meanings emerge from the context in which words are used. So for them, language is something like a catalyst.

F. R. Palmer, John Lyons and J. R. Firth insist on the same thing as Harris and Moore and Carling do.

For modern linguists, these researchers are heretics from the viewpoint of orthodox linguistics, but can modern linguists prove that orthodox linguistics is qualified for clarifying the mechanism of language? Or if we take into account extra-linguistic factors in meanings, will linguistics lose its own territory as one domain of science? This means that linguistics becomes a part of communication science. As is well known, Saussure manages to establish linguistics as

an independent branch of science in his *Cours de Linguistique Générale*. In other words, Saussure sets *langue* (a fixed code) as the object of linguistics although he does not think that *langue* is language (linguistic communication itself). As Saussure did, do we have no choice but to formulate linguistics as a study of *langue*? Can linguistics be qualified for one authentic branch of science? Or should modern linguistics, which Saussure founded, revert to pre-Saussurean linguistics, which treated language as what depended on extra-linguistic factors? Or if we take into account extra-linguistic factors such as context, will semantics as a branch of linguistics collapse?

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