
Article

The Problem of Evil

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Abstract

The Problem of Evil has been discussed as one of the major problems in monotheism. “Why does Almighty God allow evil to exist?” Various solutions to this problem have been proposed, including the Free Will Defence. But none of them is convincing. The Problem of Evil has an assumption, which is that God exists. One of the proofs of God’s existence is René Descartes’s Ontological Argument. But none of them is persuasive. Every logic has its own assumption, which needs to be verified. So this process of verification continues ad infinitum as an infinite regress. The Problem of Evil is not a problem but a pseudo-problem. So the Problem of Evil should be discussed as a matter of faith not a matter of logic.

Key Words: evil, the Free Will Defence, proof of God’s existence, the Ontological Argument, assumption, infinite regress

Introduction

In *Robinson Crusoe* (1719) by Daniel Defoe, Crusoe tells Friday that God is omnipotent and that the Devil is God’s enemy. Then, Friday says:

Well, says *Friday*, but you say, God is so strong, so great, is he not much strong, much might as the Devil? Yes, yes, says I, Friday, God is stronger than the Devil, God is above the Devil, and therefore we pray to God to tread him down under our Feet, and enable us to resist his Temptations and quench his fiery Darts. *But*, says he again, *if God much strong, much might as the Devil, why God no kill the Devil, so make him no more do wicked?* (Defoe 1981: 218)

Here, Friday’s question is, what we call, “The Problem of Evil,” which has been discussed for a long time. This is paraphrased: “Why does God let the Evil

exist?” Crusoe answers Friday’s question:

[...] I said, *God will at last punish him [the Devil] severely; he is reserv’d for the Judgment, and is to be cast into the Bottomless-Pit, to dwell with ever-lasting Fire.* This did not satisfy *Friday*, but he returns upon me, repeating my Words, *Reserve, at last, me no understand; but, Why not kill the Devil now, not kill great ago?* You may as well ask me, *said I*, Why God does not kill you and I, when we do wicked Things here that offend him? We are preserv’d to repent and be pardon’d: He [Friday] muses a while at this; *well, well*, says he, mighty affectionately, *that well; so you, I, Devil, all wicked, all preserve, repent, God pardon all* [including the Devil]. (Defoe 1981: 218–219)

Crusoe explains to Friday that even if we are wicked, God preserves us and gives us a chance to

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repent and pardons us. Friday accepts Crusoe's explanation, which means that we, including the Devil, are preserved and given a chance to repent and pardoned by God. But are we convinced by Crusoe's explanation?

1. The Problem of Evil

We experience so much evil in our lives. Evil can be classified into two: one is called moral evil, the other natural evil:

There is evil in the world: this cannot seriously be denied. Think only of the Holocaust, of Pol Pot's massacres in Cambodia, or of the widespread practice of torture. These are all examples of moral evil or cruelty: human beings inflicting suffering on other human beings, for whatever reason. Cruelty is also often inflicted upon animals. There is also a different kind of evil, known as natural or metaphysical evil: earthquakes, disease, and famine are examples of this sort of evil. (Warburton 1999: 22)

If so much evil exists in this world, why does God allow it to keep on existing? If God is omnipotent, He should be able to eliminate evil from this world. This is the Problem of Evil:

In view of the existence of so much evil, how can anyone seriously believe in the existence of an all-good God? An all-knowing God would know that evil exists; an all-powerful God would be able to prevent it occurring; and an all-good God would not want it to exist. But evil continues to occur. This is the Problem of Evil: the problem of explaining how the alleged attributes of God can be compatible with this undeniable fact of evil. This is the most serious challenge to belief in the Theists' God. The Problem of Evil has led many people to reject belief in God altogether, or at least to revise their opinion about God's supposed benevolence, omnipotence, or omniscience.

(Warburton 1999: 22-23)

Then, how has the Problem of Evil been solved?

2. Solution to the Problem of Evil

As a solution to the Problem of Evil, we have the

Free Will Defence:

By far the most important attempt at a solution to the Problem of Evil is the Free Will Defence. This is the claim that God has given human beings free will: the ability to choose for ourselves what to do. If we did not have free will we would be like robots, or automata, with no choices of our own. Those who accept the Free Will Defence argue that it is a necessary consequence of having free will that we should have the possibility of doing evil; otherwise it would not genuinely be free will. They tell us that a world in which human beings have free will which sometimes leads to evil is preferable to one in which human action is pre-determined, one in which we would be like robots, programmed only to perform good actions. Indeed, if we were pre-programmed in this way, we could not even call our actions morally good since moral goodness depends on having a choice about what we do.

(Warburton 1999: 24-25)

But there is a criticism of the Free Will Defence:

A major criticism of the Free Will Defence is that it can at best only justify the existence of moral evil, evil brought about directly by human beings. There is no conceivable connection between having free will and the existence of such natural evil as earthquakes, disease, volcanic eruptions and so on, [...]

(Warburton 1999: 26)

In response to this criticism, there is an explanation of natural evil, which says the regularity in the laws of nature has a benefit rather than disasters it brings about:

Without regularity in nature our world would be mere chaos, and we would have no way of predicting the results of any of our actions. [...] Lack of regularity in other aspects of the world might make life itself impossible. Science, as well as everyday life, relies upon there being a great deal of regularity in nature, similar causes tending to produce similar effects.

It is sometimes argued that because this regularity is usually beneficial to us, natural evil is justified since it is just an unfortunate side-effect of the laws of

nature continuing to operate in a regular way. The overall beneficial effects of this regularity are supposed to outweigh the detrimental ones.

(Warburton 1999: 27)

However, this argument is also open to a criticism:

[...], it [this argument] does not explain why an omnipotent God couldn't have created laws of nature which would never actually lead to any natural evil.

(Warburton 1999: 27)

Moreover, there is another criticism of the Free Will Defence:

If God is omnipotent, then presumably it is within his or her powers to have created a world in which there was both free will and yet no evil. In fact such a world is not particularly difficult to imagine. Although having free will always give us the possibility of performing evil, there is no reason why this should ever become an actuality. It is logically possible that everyone could have had free will but decided always to shun the evil course of behaviour.

(Warburton 1999: 26)

If God is omnipotent, He can create a world in which free will and no evil coexist. As we have seen, the Free Will Defence could not solve the Problem of Evil. There have been other solutions to this problem but any of them could not solve it, either. Could we human beings not find any possible way to explain why God allows evil to exist?

Yuval Noah Harari deals with the Problem of Evil from a different perspective. According to Harari, dualistic religion 'is a very attractive world view':

Dualism [Dualistic religion] is a very attractive world view because it has a short and simple answer to the famous Problem of Evil, one of the fundamental concerns of human thought. 'Why is there evil in the world? Why is there suffering? Why do bad things happen to good people?' (Harari 2011: 245)

Then, what is the dualistic religion Harari men-

tions?

Dualistic religions espouse the existence of two opposing powers: good and evil. [...] dualism believes that evil is an independent power, neither created by the good God, nor subordinate to it. Dualism explains that the entire universe is a battleground between these two forces, and that everything that happens in the world is part of the struggle. (Harari 2011: 245)

Moreover, Harari says that the Problem of Evil has been explained in terms of "human free will." In any case, Harari concludes that we have had "a hard time dealing with the Problem of Evil." But dualistic religions can easily solve the problem:

For dualists, it's easy to explain evil. Bad things happen even to good people because the world is not governed single-handedly by a good God. There is an independent evil power loose in the world. The evil power does bad things. (Harari 2011: 246)

However, dualistic religions cannot explain "the Problem of Order," even though they can solve "the Problem of Evil":

But if Good and Evil battle for control of the world, who enforces the laws governing this cosmic war? Two rival states can fight one another because both obey the same laws of physics. A missile launched from Pakistan can hit targets in India because gravity works the same way in both countries. When Good and Evil fight, what common laws do they obey, and who decreed these laws? (Harari 2011: 246)

Then, Harari proposes a surprising solution to this dilemma:

So, monotheism [for example, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam] explains order, but is mystified by evil. Dualism [Dualistic religion] explains evil, but is puzzled by order. There is one logical way of solving the riddle: to argue that there is a single omnipotent God who created the entire universe—and He's evil. But nobody in history has had the stomach for such a belief. (Harari 2011: 246)

We have a similar idea to Harari's. Colin McGinn says that God and the Devil are one and the same:

So we might reasonably consider the hypothesis that God is identical to the Devil: that would explain the fact that their apparent rivalry never turns into actual elimination, or at least confinement.

(McGinn 2017: 302)

Furthermore, McGinn says:

We do know that God must be *capable* of evil, because of his omnipotence; so he must have his inscrutable reasons for exercising that capacity in the guise of the Devil. This makes more sense than supposing that he allows the Devil to exist and ply his trade when he could so easily improve things by putting him out of business.

(McGinn 2017: 302)

After all, Harari cannot propose a convincing solution to the Problem of Evil. It may be profoundly arrogant of human beings to think that they can solve the Problem of Evil.

If we change the point of view, we discover that there is an assumption about the Problem of Evil. Nobody cannot deny that this problem starts from the assumption that God exists. But is it verified? If it is not, the problem will collapse. So we need to confirm whether God exists or not before we solve the Problem of Evil. So next, we shall examine the proof of God's existence.

3. Proof of God's Existence

We have the Ontological Argument as one of the proofs of God's existence. What is the Ontological Argument?

The Ontological Argument, however, is an attempt to show that the existence of God necessarily follows from the definition of God as the supreme being. Because this conclusion can be drawn *prior* to experience, it is known as an *a priori* argument.

(Warburton 1999: 19)

Then, how does the Ontological Argument prove that God exists?

According to the Ontological Argument, God is defined as the most perfect being imaginable; or, in the most famous formulation of the argument, given by St Anselm (1033–1109), as 'that being than which nothing greater can be conceived'. One of the aspects of this perfection or greatness is supposed to be existence. A perfect being would not be perfect if it did not exist. Consequently, from the definition of God it is supposed to follow that he or she necessarily exists just as it follows from the definition of a triangle that the sum of its interior angles will be 180 degrees.

(Warburton 1999: 19)

Karen Armstrong explains Anselm's proof of God's existence as follows:

He [Anselm] defined God as "that thing than which nothing more perfect can be thought [*aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit*]." [...] As a Platonist, it was natural for Anselm to think that the very nature (*ontos*) of God contains within it the necessity for God's existence. "Lord my God," he [Anselm] prays, "you so truly *are*, that it is not possible to think of you as not existing." [...] Anselm believed that the idea of God was innate: even this atheist had an idea of God in his mind or he would not have been able to deny it. Even though we live in such an imperfect world, we have a notion of absolute perfection and completeness. But a perfect thing that existed only in the mind would be a contradiction in terms, since to exist in reality (*in re*) is both greater and more complete than to exist merely as a mental concept:

If that than which nothing greater [*maius*] can be thought exists in the understanding alone, then this thing than which nothing greater can be thought is something than which a greater can be thought. And this is clearly impossible.

Therefore, Anselm concluded, "there can be no doubt at all" that this "something greater" exists "both in the understanding and in reality." [...] Anselm was not attempting a scientific or logical "proof"; rather, he was using his reasoning powers to stir up his sluggish mind so that it could "involve" itself with the immanent divine reality. And built into this "proof" was the apo-

phatic conviction that any idea that human beings could conceive of God would inevitably fall short of the reality. (Armstrong 2009: 132–133)

According to Anselm, the idea of God is innate. Armstrong thinks that Anselm was not attempting a scientific or logical proof of God’s existence. Also, Armstrong claims that Anselm’s proof of God’s existence could be accepted in a world dominated by Platonic thought:

Nevertheless, like the Muslim and Jewish *Faylasufs*, Anselm believed that the existence of God could be argued rationally, and he devised his own proof, which is usually called the “ontological” argument. Anselm defined God as “something than which nothing greater can be thought” (*aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit*). Since this implied that God could be an object of thought, the implication was that he could be conceived and comprehended by the human mind. Anselm argued that this Something must exist. Since existence is more “perfect” or complete than nonexistence, the perfect being that we imagine must have existence or it would be imperfect. Anselm’s proof was ingenious and effective in a world dominated by Platonic thought, where ideas were believed to point to eternal archetypes. (Armstrong 1993: 202)

René Descartes also uses the Ontological Argument to prove that God exists:

This argument [the Ontological Argument], which has been used by several philosophers, including René Descartes (1596–1650) in the fifth of his *Meditations*, has convinced very few people of God’s existence, but it is not easy to see precisely what is wrong with it. (Warburton 1999: 19)

Then, what is Descartes’s proof of God’s existence like? Next we shall examine it in the fifth of his *Meditations*:

Now if it follows, from the fact alone that I can produce an idea of something from my thought, that everything that I perceive clearly and distinctly as belonging to it does really belong to it, could I not also

derive an argument to demonstrate God’s existence? Certainly I find in myself an idea of God—that is, of a supremely perfect being—just as much as I find an idea of any shape or number. I understand that it belongs to God’s nature that he always exists that, as clearly and distinctly as I understand that whatever I demonstrate about any shape or number belongs to the nature of that shape or number. Therefore, even if everything on which I meditated in recent days were not true, I should attribute to God’s existence at least the same degree of certainty that I have attributed to mathematical truths until now. (Descartes 1998: 53)

Here, Descartes contrasts the idea of God with that of shape or number and insists that since shape or number clearly and distinctly exists, so does God. We have one more proof of God’s existence by Descartes in the third of his *Meditations*:

Thus the idea of God is the only one left about which to ask the question: does it contain something that could not have originated from me? By the word ‘God’ I understand some infinite substance, which is independent, supremely intelligent and supremely powerful, and by which both I, and everything else that exists (if anything else exists), was created. All these ideas are surely such that, the more carefully I examine them, the less likely it seems that they could have originated from myself alone. Therefore one should draw the conclusion from what has been said that God necessarily exists. And even though I have an idea of a substance from the very fact that I am a substance myself, it would not, however, be an idea of an infinite substance because I am finite, unless it originated from some substance that is genuinely infinite. (Descartes 1998: 38)

According to Descartes, the idea of God, some infinite substance, could not have originated from himself, who is a finite substance. So God necessarily exists. Moreover Descartes goes on to say:

As I have already said, it is clear that there must be at least as much reality in a cause as in its effect. Therefore, since I am a thinking thing and I have some idea of God, whatever cause is eventually assigned to

me, it must be agreed that it is a thinking thing and that it includes an idea of all the perfections that I attribute to God. One can ask about that cause in turn: does it derive its existence from itself or from something else? If it derives its existence from itself, it is obvious from what has already been said that it is itself God because, since it derives the power to exist from itself, it undoubtedly also has the power of possessing actually the perfections of which it has an idea, that is, all the perfections that I conceive of in God. If, however, it derives its existence from something else, then the question arises again in the same way about that, whether it derives its existence from itself or from something else, until finally one arrives at the ultimate cause, which is God. It is clear enough that there cannot be an infinite regress here, especially since I am not concerned at this stage with the cause that produced me in the past but much more with the cause that maintains me in existence at present.

(Descartes 1998: 41–42)

Descartes's line of reasoning is as follows: there is a reality of cause as in its effect. So Descartes's idea of God must have its cause outside himself, that is, from the ultimate cause, which is God. Therefore, God exists. But if effects have causes, then God (as an effect) has a cause. Then, God's cause (as an effect) has a cause. This process continues *ad infinitum*. Is this not an infinite regress? Finally Descartes asks how he, who is finite, has gained the idea of God, who is infinite:

It only remains for me to examine how I received this idea from God. I did not derive it from the senses, nor did it ever arrive unexpectedly as the ideas of sensible things usually do when external objects impinge, or seem to impinge, on the sense organs. Nor was it fabricated by me, for it is clear that I can neither add to it nor subtract anything from it. Thus it follows that it is innate in me, just as the idea of myself is innate in me.

(Descartes 1998: 42–43)

Here, Descartes, like St Anselm, says that the idea of God is innate in himself. Although Descartes insists that not only the idea of God but also that of himself is innate in himself, Buddhism teaches us that

our self is just an illusion and does not exist at all. Harari says the same thing as this:

Doubts about the existence of free will and individuals are nothing new, of course. Thinkers in India, China and Greece argued that 'the individual self is an illusion' more than 2,000 years ago. (Harari 2015: 305)

As we have seen, Descartes proves the existence of God. But why has this argument of Descartes's convinced very few people of God's existence?

One common criticism of the Ontological Argument is that it would seem to allow us to define all kinds of things into existence. For instance, we can quite easily imagine a perfect island, with a perfect beach, perfect wildlife, and so on, but it obviously does not follow from this that this perfect island actually exists somewhere. So, because the Ontological Argument seems to justify such a ridiculous conclusion, it can easily be seen to be a bad argument. Either the argument's structure must be unsound, or else at least one of its initial assumptions must be false; otherwise it could not possibly give rise to such obviously absurd consequences.

(Warburton 1999: 19–20)

This is a theologian, Gaunilo's criticism although Warburton does not mention him. This passage reminds us of Plato's theory of form. According to him, "this perfect island" exists in the realm of form.

Even if the Ontological Argument is accepted, we have a criticism of this argument:

A bachelor can be defined as an unmarried man. Being unmarried is the *essential* defining property of a bachelor. Now, if I were to say 'bachelors exist', I would not be giving a further property of bachelors. Existence is not the same sort of thing as the property of being unmarried: for anyone to be unmarried they must first exist, though the concept of a bachelor remains the same whether or not any bachelors do happen to exist.

If we apply the same thinking to the Ontological Argument, we see that the mistake it makes is to treat the existence of God as if it were simply another property, like omniscience, or omnipotence. But God could

not be omniscient or omnipotent without existing, so by giving a definition of God at all we are already assuming that he or she exists. Listing existence as a further essential property of a perfect being is making the mistake of treating existence as a property rather than as the precondition of anything having any properties at all.

But what about fictional beings, such as unicorns? Surely we can talk about the properties of a unicorn, such as having one horn and four legs, without unicorns actually having to exist. The answer is that what a sentence like ‘Unicorns have one horn’ really means is ‘If unicorns were to exist, they would have one horn’. In other words, ‘Unicorns have one horn’ is really a hypothetical statement. So the non-existence of unicorns is not a problem for the view that existence is not a property. (Warburton 1999: 20–21)

If we rewrite a part of Warburton’s passage above, it will be:

What a sentence like ‘God is perfect’ really means is ‘If God were to exist, He would be perfect.’ In other words, ‘God is perfect’ is really a hypothetical statement.

If Warburton is right, then the non-existence of God is not a problem for the view that God is perfect (existence is not a property). So it is surprising that Descartes was satisfied with his own proof of God’s existence. If we can say that God exists because He is perfect, then we can also say that God allows evil to exist because He is perfect and never makes mistakes but we human beings are not perfect enough to understand His intentions, that is, why He allows evil to exist.

As we have seen, the Ontological Argument could not prove that God exists. Could we not verify that God exists?

There is another story about God’s existence. Richard Dawkins mentions the idea that God created the universe, which is one proof that God exists:

Creationist ‘logic’ is always the same. Some natural phenomenon is too statistically improbable, too complex, too beautiful, too awe-inspiring to have come

into existence by chance. Design is the only alternative to chance that the authors [of a creationist book, *Life—How Did It Get Here?*] can imagine. Therefore a designer [God] must have done it. And science’s answer to this faulty logic is also always the same. Design is not the only alternative to chance. Natural selection is a better alternative. Indeed, design is not a real alternative at all because it raises an even bigger problem than it solves: who designed the designer? Chance and design both fail as solutions to the problem of statistical improbability, because one [chance] of them is the problem, and the other one [design] regresses to it. Natural selection is a real solution. It is the only workable solution that has ever been suggested. And it is not only a workable solution, it is a solution of stunning elegance and power.

(Dawkins 2008: 146–147)

Here, Dawkins criticizes the creationists and insists that even if God does not exist, we can explain the complex and improbable structures of all the living creatures using natural selection. The same logic as this is seen in Nāgārjuna’s writings:

An infinite regress shows that if we accept a claim, we can apply it ad infinitum. For example, suppose that existence is produced by something. [Nāgārjuna says,] “If something is produced by something else, this ‘something else’ will be produced by another ‘something else.’ This process continues ad infinitum (anavasthā). So, if something [God], which is not produced by something else, exists, all the other things will exist likewise.” (*Mādhyamaka-śāstra*, 7–19) [...] He [Hakuseki Arai] writes in his *Record of Things Heard from the West*:

There is a doctrine that everything on the earth did not come into being by itself but someone [God] must have created it. If this is true, God also must have been created by someone else before everything came into being. So, if God has existed by Himself from the outset, then everything also must have come into being by itself. (My translation)

(Sadakata 1990: 130–132)

After all, it may be also profoundly arrogant of

human beings to think that they can prove God's existence as in the case of the Problem of Evil.

4. Infinite Regress

As we have seen, the proof of God's existence is open to a lot of criticisms. Why is that? We can treat this matter from a quite different point of view. The conclusion is that every theory or logic is based on an implicit assumption, which cannot be verified or proved as correct in its theory or logic.

For example, a numerical expression $1 + 1 = 2$ is based on an implicit assumption that the calculation is performed using a system of counting other than the binary system. If we calculate this numerical expression using the binary system, then we have $1 + 1 = 10$ instead of $1 + 1 = 2$. In this case, the binary system or any other systems of counting cannot be correct or wrong. It is an assumption, from which a theory or logic starts.

Let's take another example. Euclidean geometry starts from an assumption that parallel lines do not intersect. From this assumption, for example, we can deduce a formula that the sum of the interior angles of a triangle is 180 degrees. This assumption is called an axiom. As is well known, the axiom cannot be proved or verified as correct in Euclidean geometry because it is an assumption but not what is proved or verified as correct. So Euclidean geometry is based on an axiom or an assumption, which cannot be proved or verified as correct. But once the axiom or the assumption is supposed to be accepted, then a lot of formulae can be deduced from it along the correct line of logic. "The sum of the interior angles of a triangle is 180 degrees" is one example of those formulae.

If we apply this thinking to the proof of God's existence, what will happen? Let's take the Problem of Evil first. The problem is why God, who is omnipotent, allows evil to exist. To solve this problem, a lot of discussions have been developed, including the Free Will Defence. The Free Will Defence says that God has given human beings free will to decide what to do in a certain situation. As a result, in some cases, free will may lead human beings to do evil. If we do not have free will, our behaviour is predetermined and we will be like robots or automata. This explanation may be applicable to moral evil brought about by human

beings, but not to natural evil caused by earthquakes or any other natural disasters. But we need regularity of nature which brings about natural evil even though it leads to natural evil such as earthquakes and volcanic eruptions in order to maintain order of the world. Even so, God should have been able to create regularity of nature, which does not lead to natural evil. Moreover, from the outset God should have been able to create a world, in which free will and no evil coexisted.

What is behind the Problem of Evil? It is an assumption that God exists. The Problem of Evil will collapse unless we can prove an assumption that God exists. In other words, the Problem of Evil is based on an assumption that God exists. So the Problem of Evil will emerge after we can prove or verify an assumption that God exists. So, if God does not exist, the Problem of Evil (why God allows evil to exist) will disappear. The problem would not be a problem but a pseudo-problem like a castle in the air.

So, next, let's consider an assumption that God exists. The Ontological Argument says that God exists because God has a property of perfection, including existence, by the definition of God. In other words, God, a perfect being would not be perfect if He did not exist. Descartes says almost the same thing as this in the fifth of his *Meditations*. His proof of God's existence is one example of the Ontological Argument. But very few people are convinced by the Ontological Argument explained above. If the Ontological Argument is right, then we can make a lot of things exist using only the definition of them. For example, we can insist that an ideal dog exists somewhere because we can define a dog like that. This is what Plato thought about as the theory of form. According to Plato, everything we experience is a copy of an ideal thing, which is called form by Plato. Form is thought to exist somewhere in the realm of form but not in this real world. In the Middle Ages, Plato's form is interpreted as Christian God. In this respect, Plato's theory of form and the Ontological Argument might have something in common. In any case, the Ontological Argument is open to criticisms.

In short, God could not be omnipotent without existing. So by giving the definition of God, we are already assuming that He first exists.

As I said before, every theory or logic has an

implicit assumption. In the case of the Problem of Evil, it has an assumption that God exists. Also, the proof of God's existence has an assumption. In the Ontological Argument, it is that God is omnipotent. So, next we need to prove that God is omnipotent. Like this, to prove one thing, we need to prove another thing. To prove another thing, we need to prove still another thing. This process goes on ad infinitum. This is called an infinite regress. An infinite regress continues without limit. So a theory or logic is never finished. In other words, every theory or logic is based on an assumption, which cannot be logically proved or verified as correct. In the case of the Problem of Evil, it is based on an assumption that God exists. Also, in the case of proof of God's existence by the Ontological Argument, it is based on an assumption that God is omnipotent. But in both cases, the two assumptions that God exists and that God is omnipotent cannot be proved or verified as correct. So the Problem of Evil and Proof of God's Existence by the Ontological Argument are both pseudo-problems. This means that both of them are not problems to be solved. From the outset, both of them do not exist as problems. They are illusions just like a castle in the air. So nobody can solve the Problem of Evil and prove the God's existence at all, however hard he or she may try to. So any attempt, which has been made so far, is a waste of time after all.

Conclusion

The Problem of Evil is based on an assumption that God really exists. Then, has the existence of God been proved? If God exists because of His perfection, then God may allow evil to exist due to His perfect intentions human beings cannot understand forever. In any case, unfortunately there has been no convincing

proof of God's existence so far. Every logic or theory starts from a premise, which is not proved as correct because we need another premise again in order to prove the first premise. So this cycle of proof continues ad infinitum. This is an infinite regress. So God's existence cannot be proved as a matter of logic. That is a matter of faith. So, if God's existence is not proved, the Problem of Evil cannot be solved, either. In other words, the Problem of Evil is not a problem but a pseudo-problem.

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